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The Brazilian Economy in 20th Century
Daví José Nardy Antunes*
Introduction:  The  Development  of  the  Brazilian 
Economy after the Wall Street Crisis till the Debt Crisis 
of 1982
In  this  brief  text,  we  will  try  to  discuss the  problems  of  the 
Brazilian  Economy  and  how  these  problems  are  affected  by  the 
globalization. After the crisis of 1929, the commodity export economy 
reached a very deep crisis that was caused not only by the crack itself 
but also by the coffee overvaluation politics in use since the beginning of 
the  20th century1.  In  the  aftermath  of  the  crisis,  the  new  Brazilian 
government started to use a new kind of economic policy, some sort of 
Keynesian policy before the publication of the General Theory, in which 
the Brazilian government bought  coffee from the coffee producers  to 
keep the level of activity together with capital controls that allowed the 
government to have the whole control of the foreign reserves.
In this moment, with the confusion created in the world economy 
Brazil was able to make a national policy of development as many others 
countries like Germany did in the same time. But we were a very poor 
economy with a very low level of development despite the huge export 
1* Professor at FACAMP (College of Campinas), Institute of Economics of the UNICAMP 
and Researcher of the CESIT-IE/UNICAMP (Centro de Estudos Sindicais e de Economia 
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sector that we had, one of the top 3 in that time. In this sense, Getúlio 
Vargas, the Brazilian President, start to create public enterprises and a 
public  sector  able  to  control  and  impose  national  policies  of 
development.  Until  the forties,  the Brazilian government had a lot  of 
ability  to deal  with the USA and with Germany – the great economic 
powers at that time – and it provided the Brazilian economy with a lot 
investment  goods  and  funding  unavailable  in  our  country.  With  the 
beginning of the World War II, this situation could not stand much longer 
and  Brazil  took  the  side  of  the  Allies  and  receives  in  a  very  hard 
negotiation his first steel plant, CSN. It was some of first steps of the 
Brazilian  development  towards  an industrial  society  and had a  lot  of 
impacts over the economy.
But  in  this  first  phase  that  goes  till  1955,  the  Brazilian 
industrialization has very important blockades to the continuation of the 
process.  The  lack  of  an  industrial  sector  able  to  provide  investment 
goods  was  a  critical  problem  for  the  maintenance  of  the  economic 
growth because we were short in machinery, equipments and so on to 
keep the investment rate in an appropriated level. So we had a Gordian 
knot in the external sector that made absolutely essential the control 
over the foreign exchange in order to direct all the dollars and pounds to 
the investment goods.
Until  1955,  we  gave  other  steps  in  the  direction  of  the 
development with the creation of the PETROBRÁS (public monopolistic 
enterprise of oil), the VALE DO RIO DOCE (public monopolistic enterprise 
of mining) and the BNDE (a state bank to provide finance to the public 
sector).  But  we  still  had  problems  to  develop  the  whole  investment 
goods sector. At this time, we were trying to do it only with efforts of the 
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state because the national private sector was unable to assume the risks 
of these activities and the foreign companies were not interested – at 
that moment – to do such a thing. But with change in the international 
scenario in the middle of fifties with the production internationalization – 
the looking for profit abroad by the corporations of USA and Europe – the 
things has changed.
The  access  to  the  investment  goods  means  not  only  a  lack  of 
funding  and  foreign  exchange  but  also  the  lack  of  the  technology. 
Differently of the situation of the 19th century were the technology and 
the funding required were available to any country able to make the 
correct policies like Germany, France and Japan, in the 20th century the 
scenario has changed a lot: the funding requirements are unbelievable 
bigger and the technology is in the hands of the big corporations already 
in  place.  So  with  the  change  of  the  Competence  Capitalism  to  the 
Monopoly Capitalism the National State has an even more important role 
in the development.
In this sense, the alternative to continue with the development of 
the  Brazilian  economy  was  a  more  close  association  with  the 
transnational capital to obtain the technology and the funding necessary 
to install, at the same time, the whole investment sector. It is absolutely 
essential  because  of  the  potential  problems  in  all  the  chains  of 
production  and  in  the  intra-sector  demands,  so  the  solution  was 
presented by Juscelino Kubitschek, the President who created Brasilia. In 
the Plano de Metas (Target Plan), he implanted the whole investment 
sector required for an industrial economy without external debt and with 
an association with foreign capital and with the national private capital 
named the tripod model.
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After the end of his presidency, the Brazilian economy could be 
considered  as  a  complete  industrial  economy  –  but  not  without 
problems.  These  problems  are  related  with  the  tripod  model,  more 
specifically  with  incapability  of  the  Brazilian  economy to  develop  big 
corporations.  “The  State  Monopoly  Capitalism  assumes  in  Brazil 
particular  characteristics  that  are  consequences  of  the  late  late 
industrialization.  By one side, the monopolistic structure is marked by 
the existence of state productive sector in the base industry and by the 
deep internationalization process of the productive system, and because 
of it, the national monopolistic capital had a very huge frailty structure” 
(CARDOSO DE MELLO, 1977, p. 16).
 The tripod works pretty well to copy the industrial structure of the 
most developed capitalist industry but cannot deal with problems of the 
technology development and with the funding creation. Let’s see why. 
When we look to these issues more closely, it is easy to see that no leg 
of the tripod were able to assume the leading role necessary for the 
continuity  of  the  economic  growth.  With  the  division  of  tasks  made 
during the Kubitschek government,  no leg of  the tripod were able to 
continue with conglomeration process that it is a natural consequence of 
the economic development: the foreign capital was responsible for the 
durable  goods  industry  and  also  for  some  of  the  most  important 
industries of the heavy industry like machinery and equipment; the state 
capital was responsible for the production of industrial commodities, the 
industrial  raw materials,  energy  and infra-structure;  and  the  national 
private capital  was called to participate in remaining spaces like civil 
construction, automobile parts and the finance sector.
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But this segmentation could no longer exist because it blocks the 
capital centralization needed to the further development of the Brazilian 
economy, i.e., the technological development and the funding creation 
ask for big corporations. For example, HOBSON (1894) shows that since 
the beginning of the last century the capital accumulation is increasingly 
based in the market domination done by the big corporations because 
this is the most appropriated way to boost the profits. The growing size 
of  the  plants  and  of  the  financial  strength  and  the  more  and  more 
monopolized market structure led to even bigger profits. As this strategy 
is  successful,  the  spread  of  monopolistic  structures  are  the  logical 
outcome in all the sectors of an economy and in the financial system as 
showed  by  LENIN  (1916).  “Any  form  of  trust  necessary  led  to  a 
concentration of the financial capital which could not be reinvested in 
the inside the trust industry itself.  It should expand for outside. The new 
profits have to be transformed in general financial capital and must be 
directed to the formation and the finance of other big corporations. (…) 
The continuous expansion of the exceeding profits obliges the search for 
external  markets,  not  only  for  merchandises  but  also  for  direct 
investment and capital financial exportation” (TAVARES, 1985, p. XVIII).
So, the conglomeration process being successful, other countries 
are also reached by the monopolization process. This internationalization 
process  is  also  helpful  in  the  some  moments  of  the  business  cycle 
because  it  allows  the  big  corporations  to  defend  his  positions  with 
operations  of  foreign  trade and with  swaps in  foreign  exchange.  The 
outcome  is  even  bigger  corporations  with  an  unbelievable  financial 
potential  what includes the capability to supply his own technological 
necessities. We cannot forget that it leads to an accumulation of unused 
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productive  capability  that  could  not  be destroyed by  the competition 
and,  even  more  important,  it  creates  a  huge  capability  of  financial 
valorization of the assets and any source of bonds what could and led to 
financial instability.
As this process is blocked in the Brazilian economy, let’s see the 
sources of this blockade. From the perspective of the foreign capital, it 
easy to see that the correct process does not happened in Brazil; this 
process is already under way in the home country. In fact, the strategy 
of  the foreign big  corporations  can be viewed as an outcome of  the 
already  presented  movement  what  didn’t  imply  that  the  local 
representation  of  the international  capital  in  Brazil  couldn’t  be highly 
profitable and at the same time able to invest in new plants. However, 
the fruits of the internationalization and of the conglomeration process 
are restricted to the home countries where the real expansion is done, 
the  hardcore  of  the  most  deep  interests  and  source  of  the  cyclical 
dynamic.
In this way, the corporations are not seeking for a leading role in 
monopolization  process  of  the  Brazilian  economy:  they  are  not 
interested in continue with this process so this leg of the tripod through 
his passivity blocks the continuity of the economic development. “The 
local part of the corporation, as a fraction of an external capital bloc, is 
an  instrument  of  the  valorization  strategy  of  the  whole  bloc.  The 
penetration is an expression of a specific outcome of the inter-capitalist 
competition.  As  fraction  it  will  dispose,  for  its  valorization  in  the 
peripheral national space, of the attributes at disposal of the bloc and 
will seek corporate advice that come from the hardcore decision system. 
But, as capital that seek valorization in the national space, it will have its 
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logic  macro-determined  by  the  capitalist  economy  dynamism  of  the 
peripheral  economy”  (MACHADO RIBEIRO  DE  LESSA  &  DAIN,  1982/3, 
1998, p. 253). And, most of all, in crisis eruptions it will function as last 
resort through foreign trade and exchange operation.
Regarding the national private capital, the problematic came from 
other side, related with the enterprise structure and motivated by social 
and political factors. The Brazilian companies – never big corporations 
but always familiar groups – have extreme pernicious origin vices for the 
reason  that  they  were  originated  from  the  colonial  export  economy. 
Their vision is quite narrow because they don’t want to be exposed to 
hostile takeover and this is explaining factor for the family property so 
they  also  close  the  door  to  the  capital  centralization.  In  fact,  tripod 
formation pact establishes a small parcel of the industrial activities to 
national private capital. “The entrance in these industries (capital goods) 
require a so extraordinary amount of initial capital and the dominium of 
a highly complex technology that it was only available to the big foreign 
corporation and to the big state corporation”  (CARDOSO DE MELLO & 
NOVAIS, 1998, p. 590). 
At the same time it doesn’t mean that the national capital had a 
narrow valorization space: its  space is  non-industrial  and quite linked 
with real  estate investments  and neither  a little  bit  interested in  the 
creation of the financial capital. The capitals already established in the 
financial sector were also not able to make this movement because they 
were  excessively  connected  to  mercantile  sphere,  their  origin,  and 
backed in short run profits. 
The fratricide between the different capitals which is the base of a 
capitalist economy at least in his origins is not allowed in the Brazilian 
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economy and also  helps  to  block  the  capital  centralization:  here  the 
blockade appears as a barrier to takeover of the others companies that 
make impossible the formation of national private big corporations. All 
the time they are not able to accompany the capital size requirements 
demanded by the economic development in the world. And we cannot 
forget that the industrial sector lives a very contradictory relation with 
the financial and with the export sector, both with a much differentiated 
dynamic.
By contrast, the South-Korean case is quite different because they 
didn’t have this problems and the South-Korean State was able to lead 
the industrialization process.  "In 1961, however, the field was clear for 
the assumption of state power. The landed nobility had been destroyed; 
the peasantry was less rebellious as a result of a land reform; and the 
'captains of industry' were beholden to the state for their regeneration. 
Only  workers  and  students  remained  as  opponents  to  military  rule. 
Industrial  workers,  however,  were  still  only  a  small  portion  of  the 
population. As for the students, their role in an industrialization based on 
learning became pivotal. The Hangul generation, the first generation of 
students since the nineteenth century to escape education under the 
Japanese,  came off  the  streets  and into  the  modern  factories  of  the 
1970s as managers" (AMSDEN, 1989, p. 52).
So, we need to ask why the Brazilian State was not able to do such 
a movement. When we look to the role of public corporation is easy to 
note that this is the most appropriate capital to assume the leadership in 
the continuation of the process as South Korea did. In late late comer 
industrializations,  the role  of  the State Corporations  and of  the State 
itself  is  much  more  important  because  the  planning  capability,  the 
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funding  required,  the  association  with  the  foreign  capital  and  the 
capability to invest before the existence of the demand are bigger than 
in late industrialization of the Western Europe and Japan.  
Here,  we  need  to  say  that  the  Brazilian  State  had  a  very 
ambiguous position for the reason that he was the commander in chief 
of  the most important  investment decisions of  the national  economy, 
opening  markets  and  new  demands  for  the  private  investment  that 
come only after the public action. However, the situation is completely 
different when we look to the profits division of the economy: the public 
enterprises  only  served  as  sources  of  profits  to  the  private  sector  – 
national  or foreign – what destroyed any possibility of an accelerated 
capital accumulation for the State capital. The subside provision, the low 
prices  of  the  public  corporations  has  crushed  the  chances  of  the 
prolongation  of  the  economic  development  through  the  State 
corporations. More than this, the State was forbid to make any attempt 
of conglomeration or creation of holding in his enterprises.
Despite of his position as a one of the strongest legs of the tripod, 
the  State  capital  was  committed  with  the  profit  accumulation  of  the 
private  sector.  But  this  was  a  problem  because  it  didn’t  solve  our 
structural  problems.  In this context,  the continuance of  the economic 
development faced a challenge not surpassed but the existed structure. 
The  most  probable  situation  here,  given  the  structure  and  all  the 
restrictions,  was  the  stagnation  and  the  interruption  of  this  process. 
Fortunately or unfortunately, the dawn of the globalization reached the 
Brazilian  economy  in  the  end  of  the  sixties.  With  growing  problems 
pilled-up by the Bretton Woods system associated with the unbelievable 
expansion of the Euro-market – given the lenience of the Central Banks 
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of the Europe and USA – the underdeveloped countries became a new 
frontier to the capital exportation in the beginning of the globalization. 
As the banks were creating money in an almost pure credit economy in 
terms of Wicksell, they needed to lend it to someone in order to create 
more  and  more  dollars.  The  consequence  was  the  ‘capture’  of  the 
economies  like  Brazil,  Argentina,  Mexico  and  South  Korea:  all  these 
countries suffered an astonishing increase in their external debt.
It was a solution for the Brazilian capitalism, at least in the short 
run. Because the great difficulty was at that moment the appearance of 
some agent able to assume the leading role of the capital accumulation, 
investing  before  the  demand  –  with  an  strong  capital  centralization 
enough to create a virtuous cycle.  Without  this  transformation in  the 
capital  structure,  Brazil  adopted  the  effortless  solution  of  the 
maintenance of the same problematic structure that could give further 
steps ahead with the huge injection of external debt provided by the 
globalization.
But this attempt was condemned to the failure. When you start to 
use external debts to provide funding to new investments in home, you 
need to have some strategy at least to cope with the debt payments like 
policies towards the augmenting of exports in an appreciable amount. As 
this  secondary  issue  wasn’t  a  concern  for  the  authorities,  the  debt 
increase  was  really  fast  and  soon  we  arrived  to  a  Ponzi scheme of 
finance as we can see in the Table 1.
Table 1: Brazilian External Debt and External Interest Payments
Yea
r
External 
Debt 
Interest 
Payments
10
(US$ 
millions)
(US$ millions)
197
0
6.240 284
197
1
8.284 344
197
2
11.464 489
197
3
14.857 840
197
4
20.032 1.370
197
5
25.115 1.863
197
6
32.145 2.091
197
7
37.951 2.462
197
8
52.187 3.344
197
9
55.803 5.348
198
0
64.259 7.457
198
1
73.963 10.305
198
2
85.487 12.551
198
3
93.745 10.263
198
4
102.127 11.449
198
5
105.171 11.239
198
6
111.203 10.245
198
7
121.188 9.319
198 113.511 10.591
11
8
198
9
115.506 10.937
199
0
123.439 10.868
Source: Brazil’s Central Bank.
When the United States in the pursue of maintenance of the dollar 
status as the most powerful currency raises the interest rates to almost 
20% a  year, the debt services experienced  a sudden explosion. This 
could only stand with bank credit prolongation propitiated by the banks’ 
financial frailty – consequence of the high exposure of the whole banking 
system to the debtors. But the situation was getting worse and worse 
and Mexico default in 1982 cracked the possibility to sustain such an 
unbearable situation.  Since then, the Brazilian economy became half-
stagnated and with another structural problem: the debt crisis and the 
IMF adjustment policies. 
25 Years of Stagnation
With so many structural problems and pressed by the IMF and the 
U.S. government, Brazil became a country of very low economic growth 
in comparison with biggest rate of last 50 years (7,1% a year) as can be 
seen  in  the  Table  2.  All  the  parameters  of  the  social  and  economic 
condition had a sudden stop in the improvement or just started to get 
worse.
So, we can truly speak of a very bad insertion in the dawn of the 
globalization that worsened the structural problems already in place. In 
the first phase of the globalization, Brazil created an excruciating burden 
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to  the  Brazilian  economy  in  the  next  decade.  With  the  high  debt 
payments,  the  solution  was  a  huge  cut  in  public  spending  both  in 
investment and in  the consumption  and at  the same was required a 
large augment of the interest rates and the concession of subsidies to 
the export sector. This state of affairs was combined with a reduction of 
the  elbow  room  for  the  government  fiscal  policy  by  two  ways:  the 
income was decreasing and exactly by this the government’s share in 
the  income  and  at  the  same  time  the  inflation  rate  had  heavy 
acceleration associated with the necessary and continuous competitive 
devaluations.  So,  all  the  demands  were  increasing  over  the  State  in 
growing  penury:  it  imposes  a  significant  deterioration  of  the  social 
expenditure and a considerable weakening of all  social indicators: the 
unemployment  rate  became large  and  significant,  the  wages  in  real 
terms had a  decrease,  the  income inequality  increased,  the  violence 
index exploded and so on.
Table 2: Brazilian Economic Growth, Percentage of GDP
Year Growth Rate
Historical Rate (1948-1981) 7,1
1982 0,8
1983 -2,9
1984 5,4
1985 7,8
1986 7,5
1987 3,5
1988 -0,1
1989 3,2
1990 -4,3
1991 1,0
1992 -0,5
1993 4,9
Adjustment Period Rate (1982-1993) 2,2
1994 5,9
1995 4,2
1996 2,7
13
1997 3,3
1998 0,1
New Debt Growing Process Rate (1994-
1998)
3,2
1999 0,8
2000 4,4
2001 1,3
2002 1,9
2003 0,5
2004 4,9
2005 2,3
New Adjustment Period Rate (1999-2004) 2,3
Source: IBGE.
With  the  new  wave  of  globalization  in  the  beginning  of  the 
nineties, the situation has changed not because we were able to grow 
again but because the policies were more or less the same and now the 
neo-liberal discourse was much more fitted with. We made changes in 
the regulation of the economy, privatization of almost all the productive 
sector in the hands of  the State, we took out dozens of obstacles to 
inflow and outflow of capital and goods. But even with all this reforms 
and with large inflow of capital, we were not able to come back to the 
high economic growth rates, the interest rates were never bellow 10% a 
year and the all the economic structural problems remained unsolved 
deteriorating  even  more  the  social  conditions  of  the  population  in 
general  and deepen the  difference  between the  few riches  receiving 
interests and the many poor unemployed.
So,  we  can  say  that  the  globalization  since  its  very  beginning 
didn’t help the Brazilian economy to solve her most important structural 
problem and helps to create another one. But the things didn’t need to 
be in this way as we can see the successful experiences of India, China 
and South Korea were the integration passed by the productive markets 
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and not by the short run financial markets. It is important to establish 
what kind of participation in the globalization process is important and 
what  could  be harmful  to the country.  As  a solution  for  problems,  it 
passes for the fast economic growth, most of all. It is main question and 
requires  a  huge  decrease  of  the  interest  rates,  a  reduction  of  the 
financial  openness  and  the  foreign  reserves  accumulation.  After  the 
coming back of the economic growth the whole situation is changed and 
social and economic problems will  not be solved by some sort magic 
wand.  But  with  the  political  clash  between  the  social  forces, 
remembering  the  fact  that  with  the  labour  market  heated  the  trade 
unions condition to fight for better conditions for the workers is stronger. 
In this sense,  the economic growth in 7-8% is mandatory in order  to 
open opportunities to solve the economic and the social problems of the 
Brazilian economy.
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